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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOGGAN & HALL & HIGGINS, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
NELSON "\V. HALL and RAY-
MOND C. HIGGINS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10453 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Because respondent has raised certain new issues 
both as to the nature of its claim and dehors the record, 
as to the disposition of certain preliminary matters by 
ihe eourl below, appellants are compelled to file this 
brief in reply thereto. Although appellants feel that the 
statements made relating to respondent's motion for 
preliminary iujunction are immaterial to the ultimate 
1 
disposition of this case, it is important that this comt 
not be misled into believing that the court below at the 
hearing upon respondent's motion for preliminary in-
junction restrained appellants from continuing to sen-
ice the five advertising customers in question. Respon-
dent fails to point out in its brief that it sought prelimi-
narily to enjoin appellants from both soliciting and sen-
icing the five advertising accounts in question. Respon-
dent further fails to point out that the court specif- ' 
ically excluded these five accounts from the effect of its 
preliminary injunction. The order was not, as respon- , 
dent suggests, that appellants were restrained from the 
"further solicitation" of respondent's customers. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT MAY NOT CHANGE ITS , 
THEORY OF RECOVERY ON APPEAL. 
Respondent throughout Point IV of its brief claims 
that it is entitled to recover a money judgment from 
the defendants based not only upon such loss as it may , 
have sustained by reason of the alleged wrongful con· 
duct of appellants, but also upon the gain and enrich· 
ment derived by appellants as a result thereof. An 
examination of plaintiff's complaint and the Pre-Trial 
Order entered below indicate clearly that the action 
commenced by respondent was for the recovery of 
"damages" by reason of certain tortious conduct. No· 
2 
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here in the pleadings, the Pre-Trial Order nor the 
pruof of the case did respondent seek to impress a con-
:-ilrudiYe trust upon the stock of appellants in the new 
corporation formed by them.Nowhere in the pleadings, 
tlic Pre-Trial Order or the proof did respondent ask 
for a11 accounting from appellants of the profits which 
they had derived to the time of trial from servicing the 
customers formerly serviced by respondent. Now here 
in the pleadings, the Pre-Trial Order or the proof did 
respondent request a judgment based upon the theory 
of money had and received by reason of the profits or 
gain derived by appellants from these customers to the 
time of trial. Respondent's action was pleaded and 
proYed on the theory of recovering damages for the loss 
sustaiued by it - no more. It requires no citation for 
the fundamental proposition that a party cannot pro-
ceed on one theory below and another on appeal. Indeed, 
as will be hereinafter demonstrated, respondent could 
not recover on both theories, even had it pleaded both 
theories; hut it was required, as it did, to make an elec-
tion between the two. 
POINT II. 
UESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT IT IS 
ENTITLED TO A MONEY JUDGMENT 
BASED IN PART UPON THE LOSS SUF-
FERED AND IN PART UPON THE GAIN 
DERI\'ED BY APPELLANTS IS ERRONE-
Ot'S, BECAUSE THE T'VO ARE ALTER-
XATI \'E AND INCONSISTENT RE]_\,1EDIES. 
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As hereinabove stated, respondent in its brief , 
attempts to justify the award of damages below by 
asserting that the trial court could, as it did, base its 
award in part on the gain or enrichment derived by 
appellants from servicing the customers allegedly 
wrongfully solicited. 
As pointed out in appellants' original brief, the 
trial court based its award of damages upon findings 
relating to (I) the gross revenue derived by the respon-
dent from these customers and ( 2) the salary received 
by the appellant Hall from the new corporation of 
Higgins & Hall, Inc. By asserting that it is entitled 
to a money judgment based upon both factors, respon-
dent wants to have its cake and eat it too. 
An examination of each of the cases cited by 
respondent in support of its contention reveals that the 
sole remedy therein sought by the plaintiff corporation 
was for equitable relief by way of constructive trust 
and an accounting for profits derived. In no case did the 
corporation seek in addition thereto damages by way 
of compensation for the loss sustained by reason of the 
wrongful act of the corporate director or officer in-
volved. 
Among those cases cited by respondent is the land-
mark case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A2d 503 (Del.). In 
order to obtain a complete factual picture of this case, 
it is necessary also to read the reported decision of the 
trial court which appears in the case of Loft, Inc. v. 
Guth, 2 A2d 225 (Del.). The facts of that case, as 
gleaned from both op1mons, were that the defendant 
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(; u th was president of the plaintiff corporation, Loft, 
lite.. 1111til Oetober 21, 1935, at which time he resigned 
J11 s office. During the years 1931 to 1935, Guth domi-
nated LofL Inc. and controlled Pepsi-Cola Company, 
:t Delaware corporation. During this time, without the 
knowle(lge or consent of Loft's Board of Directors, 
(~uth speut his energies developing Pepsi-Cola Com-
pany; drawing upon the resources of Loft without 
limit; using, for the benefit of Pepsi-Cola Company, 
Loft's plant, its facilities, its materials, its credit and 
e,·en its employees to further his purpose. Loft filed an 
adiou against Guth to impress a trust in its favor up011 
all shares of the capital stock of Pepsi-Cola registered 
in the name of Guth, to transfer these shares to Loft 
arnl for an accounting. It did not also seek damages 
for its losses. The Chancellor's Decree, affirmed on 
appeal, required Guth to transfer his shares in Pepsi-
Cola Company to Loft; required Guth to account for 
and pay to Loft monies representing dividends declared 
on this stock prior to transfer; required Guth to account 
for and pay to Loft any other profits or gains attrib-
lltable to his shares of stock in Pepsi-Cola Company; 
and required Guth to pay to Loft all salary or compen-
sation paid to him by Pepsi-Cola Company prior to 
October 21, 1935, the date of his resignation from Loft, 
tugether with all salary paid by Pepsi-Cola Company 
tu Loft subsequent to October 21, 1935, in excess of 
\\hat should be determined to be reasonable, with Guth 
to be ereclited with such sums as found due to him or 
l" Pep~i-Cola Company from Loft. 
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It is interesting to note that in the instant case, 
respondent contends that appellant Hall's salary frun 1 
the new corporation should properly be considered b~· 
the court in awarding a money judgment, regardles.~ 
of the fact that it was earned subsequent to his resigna-
tion as an officer and director of respondent; regardless 
of the reasonableness thereof; regardless of the amount 
thereof that may be attributable to the customers alleged-
ly solicited from respondent; and in addition, not a.y an 
alternative to its claim for compensatory damages for 
the loss sustained by respondent. 
Respondent, in its argument, overlooks two crucial 
phrases in its quotation from the Loft case at Page 43 
of its brief, and its quotation from the Lutherland case 
on Page 42 of its brief. That phrase is "at its election." 
In the cases cited by respondent, the corporation elected 
to pursue its equitable remedies in lieu of any claim for 
damages for the loss sustained by the wrongful conduct 
of the corporate officer or director. 
The case of Sears, Roebuck ~ Co. v. Blade, 123 
F.Supp. 131 ( S.D. Calif. 1954), highlights the error 
committed by the trial court below and compounded 
by respondent in its brief. The plaintiff corporation in 
this case commenced an action for damages for fraud 
by its employee in conspiring with two engravers in the 
Los Angeles area for secret commissions, in the naturr 
of kickbacks, in exchange for which the engravers re-
ceived through the employee Blade an exclusive han<lliug 
of all of Sears' newspaper mat engravings at a price 
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higlicr than that customarily paid in the area. Sears 
had, prior to the Federal Court action, brought an action 
iu the Superior Court of Los Angeles for the State of 
California against Blade for money had and received 
on the theory of his having obtained secret profits in 
breach of his fiduciary relation to the corporation. Blade 
moved for a summary judgment in the Federal court 
action on the theory that there had been an election of 
remedies by virtue of the prior state court proceedings. 
The court granted the motion for summary judgment 
stating in pertinent part as follows: 
"The suit in the Superior Court was for money 
had and received - it is ex contractu; the suit 
here is ex delicto. They are inconsistent." 
* * * 
"By electing to sue ex contractu in the state 
court, plaintiff waived the tort by Blade and 
cannot waive half a tort by suing in contract 
and then sue in another case for the other half 
of the tort. When one sues ex contractu, whether 
on an expressed or implied contract, the bringing 
of that suit affirms the contract. It is the essence 
of the plaintiff's cause of action in the within case 
that it disaffirms and disavows the acts of Blade 
in letting contracts and receiving money from 
his co-defendants; it is the essence of the plain-
tiff's cause of action in the state court that the 
defendant, Blade, WM under the obligation of 
an imvlied contract to pay over to the plaintiff 
all monies that he received." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
So it is in the instant case that respondent, by seek-
mg compensatory damages for the loss it sustained, 
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necessarily disaffirmed the acts and conduct comphnc• 
of. In order to obtain the gains an<l benetibi deri\c,; 
by appellants on the theory that such benefits '.\'('\\ 
derived for the benefit of the respondent corpora~io11, 
respondent must necessarily affirm said acts and con-
duct. The two positions are obviously inconsistent. 
The Restatement of Trusts 2d, Section 205, states 
the remedies available to the cestui que trust in the 
alternative as follows: 
"If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is 
chargeable with: 
(a) any loss or depreciation in vc.tlue of lhc 
trust estate resulting from the breach of trust; 
or 
( b) any profit made by him through the breach 
of trust; or 
( c) any profit which would have accrued to 
the trust estate if there had been no breach of 
trust." (Emphasis supplied) 
The Restatement of Trusts 2d, at Section ~Oti. 
states as follows: 
"The rule as stated in Section 205 is applicable 
where the trustee in breach of trust sells trmt 
property to himself individually, or sells his in-
dividual property to himself as trustee, or other-
wise violates his duty of loyalty." 
Throughout the Restatement, it is made clear thnl 
these remedies are alternative, not cumulative. For e\ 
ample, in Section 2H, Restatement, ibid., the court i-
given the option to enforce 'vhichever of the se-reral 
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oltcn/{/fivc remedies is most appropriate for the purposes 
of the trust, \vhere there is disagreement among the 
beuefkiaries or where one of two or more beneficiaries 
is under an incapacity. 
See also W cightman v. Hadley, 248 P.2d 801 (Cal. 
A pp. 1952), which albeit on facts substantially different 
from those of the instant case, stated the general rule 
dearly applicable to the instant case as follows: 
"This was not an action at law for conversion 
of the stock. 'Vhen plaintiff sued in equity for 
the proceeds of a sale of the property, she elected 
her remedy. The rules of damages for conversion 
were inapplicable." 
* * * 
"Damages and restitution are alternative re-
medies and an election to pursue one is a bar to 
invoking the other." 
POINT Ill. 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT THE 
LOSS SUSTAINED BY IT WAS CAUSED 
BY APPELLANTS' CONDUCT IS AGAINST 
THE LA'V AND EVIDENCE. 
\Vhile appellants recognize that the evidence must 
be viewed on appeal favorably to respondent, respon-
dent has deliberately ignored undisputed testimony in 
its assertions on the question of causation. In Point III 
of its brief, respondent omits any reference to or expla-
nation of the dear and unequivocal testimony with 
9 
respect to this point of each of the advertising customeh 
involved other than that of Peter 'Vilson. The te~ti­
mony of the other customers invo!Yed with respeet t 11 
this issue has been detail eel at length in appellants· ori-
ginal brief and will not be repeated herein. 
Respondent cites the case of Nichuls-1llurriii ''· 
illorris, 174 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y., 1959), relied upon 
by appellants, for the proposition that the court therein 
rejected the "novel" theory relied upon by appellants. 
because the court awarded damages to the plaintiff in 
that action. The so-called "novel" theory of appellants 
is the very theory articulated by the court in the ]JI orris 
case, and is as old as the law of torts itself. The reason 
the court awarded damages in the Morris case is not 
because the court rejected the theory advanced by defen-
dant therein, but because the court specifically found 
that the distributorship would have left the plaintiff 
corporation within a year after l\lorris left its employ 
in any event; and it therefore based its award of damages 
predicated upon one year's loss of profits, realistically 
evaluated at $22,500.00. 
The distinction to be drawn between the record 
in the Morris case and that of the instant case is that 
based upon the unequivocal testimony of the various 
advertising customers called below, these accounts would 
have terminated the services of respondent and engagcrl 
Hall as their agent, not within a year of his resignation. 
but immediately thereupon. 
It is significant further that the court below marle 
no finding whatsoeYcr with respect to this factual issue 
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Nor does the case of Duane Jones Co., Inc. v. 
l/urkc, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y., 1954) relied upon heavi-
ly by respondent, support its position. The quoted por-
t.ion of this case at Page 38 of respondent's brief indicates 
that the issue raised by appellants in the instant case, 
as it relates to causation, was not one that was raised 
in the Duane Jones case. The defendants there argued 
that the plaintiff had "resigned" its advertising custom-
ers, not that its customers would in any event "resign" 
the plaintiff. 
POINT IV. 
IN YIE\V OF THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT BELOW, THE VALUE OF THE 
ADVERTISING ACCOUNTS CANNOT BE 
PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN REVIE"T_ 
ING THE COURT'S A'VARD OF DAMAGES. 
Respondent states at Page 44 of its brief that its 
approach to the question of damages was from two 
standpoints: (I) The value of an advertising account 
to an agency, and (2) the revenue derived and expected 
from the accounts taken plus the gain to defendants 
in the likelihood that it would continue. The findings 
of the court below, as noted in appellant's brief, found 
only the yross revenue derived by respondent from the 
a<Totmts in question and the salary derived by the de-
fendant Hall from the new corporation, neither of 
whieh as hercinabove pointed out and as set forth in the 
original brief, are proper, because (I) They represent 
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alternative remedies; ( 2) the award of damages must b, 
based upon net, not gross revenue; ( 3) the salary of tiH· 
defendant Hall, standing alone, is not a proper standard 
for the court to follow in determining what, if any gaiu, 
both defendants derived as a result of their alleged 
wrongful acts. 
The significant thing is, however, that responde11t 
now argues that the award of damages can be sustained 
by reason of the testimony of the witness Alfred (jarri-
gues, who attempted to fix a value of an advertising 
account to an agency. If this is the case, then the findings 
of the court are deficient insofar as respondent's Yie11 
of the case is concerned because there is no finding a1 ' 
to value, which was obviously an integral part of respo11-
dent's claim for damages. 
If, on the other hand, the court's findings are not 
deemed to be insufficient for the reason that it omitted 
a finding of value, then the only conclusion that this 
court can draw therefrom is that the trial court belcm 
rejected respondent's testimony regarding value. Tho-
mas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 U. 91, 151 Pac. 543. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents, by conceding that its claim for m011ey 
judgment is based upon ( l) the loss to the plaintiff ror-
poration, measured by the value of the accounts, upon 
which no finding was made, and the gross revenue to he 
derived therefrom, and ( 2) the ultimate benefit and 
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ellrichment to defendants therefrom, neither pleaded nor 
prore<l below, and an alternative and inconsistent re-
rnedy with the first, compels a reversal of the trial court's 
;udgment and a remand for entry of judgment in favor 
,I 
of appellants' no cause of action or at best, entry of 
judgment for respondent for nominal damages only. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN of 
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEIN 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants. 
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